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For many years, the accountability of the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) to provincial 
governments has been a subject of debate.2 The 
Constitutional Court case between the Minister of 
Police and the Premier of the Western Cape bears 
testimony to the contestation in this area. The 
uncertainty was as a result of section 206 of the 
Constitution, which states that policing is a national 
competency but, at the same time, confers oversight 
powers to provinces.3 These constitutional provisions 
have caused confusion regarding where responsibility 
actually lies. The formulation of section 206 was 
the product of fierce debate during negotiations 
preceding the ushering in of democracy in South 
Africa and deals mainly with the allocation of policing 
powers to the national and provincial governments. 
The question before negotiators at the time was 
whether police should be controlled at national or 
provincial levels.4  
This article seeks to analyse the case of the 
commission of inquiry in Khayelitsha in the Western 
Cape and considers the implications for SAPS 
accountability to provincial governments in the future. 
Because the matter was heard by the Western 
Cape High Court before it was adjudicated by the 
Constitutional Court, the analysis considers the 
judgement of the Western Cape High Court in the 
matter.5 The minority judgement of the Western Cape 
High Court is also considered.6 Even though minority 
judgements have no binding effect on lower courts, 
they do have persuasive force on future cases and 
therefore cannot be underestimated. Furthermore, 
On 24 August 2012, the Premier of the Western Cape appointed a commission of inquiry, in terms of section 
206(5) of the Constitution, to probe complaints of police inefficiency and a breakdown of relations between 
the community and the police in Khayelitsha, a township in the Western Cape. The Minister of Police and the 
National Police Commissioner challenged this decision and lodged an urgent application with the High Court of 
the Western Cape. The adjudication of this matter by the High Court and, subsequently, by the Constitutional 
Court, presented an opportunity for the courts to clarify the scope of provincial policing powers. This article 
analyses the courts’ interpretation of the scope of provincial policing powers and argues that the adjudication of 
this matter has clarified the powers of provinces with regard to policing. The article also examines impediments 
to the exercise of provincial executives’ policing powers.
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minority decisions can contribute to the development 
of our jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation.7
This case concerns the appointment of a commission 
of inquiry to probe allegations of police inefficiency 
and the breakdown of trust between the community 
and the police in the Western Cape. The Premier 
of the Western Cape had received complaints from 
the Women’s Legal Centre on behalf of various civil 
society organisations, including the Social Justice 
Coalition. The allegations mainly concerned the area 
of Khayelitsha, a township in Cape Town under the 
jurisdiction of the City of Cape Town. The complaints 
included, among others, allegations of ‘widespread 
inefficiencies, apathy, incompetence and systemic 
failure of policing routinely experienced by Khayelitsha 
residents’.8 The Premier appointed a commission 
of inquiry in terms of section 206 (3) and (5), to be 
read with section 127(2) (e) of the Constitution,9 
and section 1(1) of the Western Cape Provincial 
Commissions Act,10 to investigate these allegations. 
The establishment of this commission was widely 
acknowledged as being a good first step towards 
addressing the unacceptably high crime rate in 
Khayelitsha.11  
However, the Minister of Police challenged the 
Premier and questioned her authority to appoint this 
commission of inquiry. He contended that the Premier 
did not have the power to appoint a commission 
with coercive powers against members of the 
SAPS and with powers to subpoena witnesses. He 
maintained that the Premier had failed to comply 
with her constitutional obligations with regard to the 
requirements of cooperative governance and that the 
terms of reference of the commission were vague 
and overly broad.12  
The Court, therefore, had the task of interpreting 
the powers of provinces with regard to policing, 
including that of appointing commissions of inquiry 
to investigate the SAPS.13 The Court also had to 
determine the extent of the duty of both the Premier 
and the Minister with regard to the principles of 
cooperative governance and inter-governmental 
relations, in the event of a dispute between two or 
more different spheres of government.14 
This article seeks to contribute to the clarification of 
the role of provincial governments in policing matters.
History of sAPs accountability 
at provincial level
The advent of democracy in South Africa brought 
with it a plethora of changes to the structure and form 
of the country, including that of police accountability. 
Some of these changes were required by the first 
interim constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
In the interim constitution, police services fell under 
the direction of national government as well as 
various provincial governments.15 It is clear that under 
the interim constitution, provincial governments 
had powers to control the police in their respective 
provinces.16 
However, when the final Constitution (hereinafter 
referred to as the Constitution) was adopted by the 
Constitutional Assembly in 1996, the provisions of 
the interim constitution were drastically changed. 
Under the Constitution, the powers of provinces were 
curtailed and they were left with only monitoring, 
oversight and liaison functions.17 This curtailment 
of provincial powers in policing was considered by 
the Constitutional Court in the 1996 case of the 
certification of the Constitution.18
The question considered by the Constitutional 
Court in the 1996 certification case was whether 
the new powers of monitoring, oversight and 
liaison equalled the powers contained in the interim 
constitution relating to control of the police. The 
Constitutional Court agreed that provinces’ loss 
of direct control over the provincial commissioner 
was a significant diminution.19 The Court further 
agreed that the provincial functions of oversight, 
monitoring and liaison were important functions and 
that their effective exercise by the province could 
have a profound influence on the performance of the 
provincial commissioner’s functions, although the 
measure of control was reduced and indirect.20  
To compensate for the provinces’ loss of direct 
control of the police, the provinces were given 
powers to establish commissions of inquiry to probe 
allegations of police inefficiency and dysfunctional 
relations with the police.21 It was these powers that 
became the subject of contestation in the case under 
review.
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Current legal position
Under the Constitution, the powers to control and 
manage the police service in accordance with 
national policy, set by the national Minister of Police, 
are vested in the National Commissioner.22 In terms 
of Part A of schedule 4, the Constitution provides 
that the province and national government have 
concurrent competency over policing. However, 
the powers of the province are qualified in that the 
powers of the provincial executive are, to an extent, 
set out in chapter 11 of the Constitution. In terms of 
the Constitution, provinces are entitled to:
•	Monitor	police	conduct
•	 Oversee	the	effectiveness	and	efficiency	of	the	






policing with respect to crime and policing in the 
province23 
These provisions are characterised by high levels of 
ambiguity. For instance, there is no clarity regarding 
the parameters of authority to ‘promote good 
relations between the police and the community’.24 
In order to perform the above-mentioned functions, 
the province is given powers to:
•	 Investigate,	or	appoint	a	commission	of	inquiry	
into any complaints of police inefficiency or a 
breakdown in relations between the police and any 
community
•	Make	recommendations	to	the	cabinet	member	
responsible for policing25 
The Constitution provides that:
•	 A	member	of	the	cabinet	must	be	responsible	for	
policing and must determine national policing policy 
after consulting the provincial executive and taking 
into account the policing needs and priorities of the 
provinces as determined by the provincial executive
•	 The	national	policing	policy	may	make	provision	for	
different policies in respect of different provinces 
after taking into account the policing needs and 
priorities of these provinces.26 
The Constitution further provides for the following:
•	 Provincial	commissioners	are	responsible	for	
policing their respective provinces in accordance 
with national legislation and subject to the control 
of the National Commissioner 
•	 Annually,	provincial	commissioners	must	report	on	
policing in the province to the provincial legislature 
and submit a copy of the report to the National 
Commissioner
•	 If	the	provincial	commissioner	loses	the	confidence	
of the provincial executive, that executive may 
institute appropriate proceedings for the removal 
or transfer of the commissioner or take disciplinary 
action against him/her in accordance with national 
legislation27  
Provincial policing powers
The Constitutional Court, in the judgement delivered 
by Moseneke DCJ, affirmed that the Premier and 
the province had a duty to respect, protect and 
promote the fundamental rights of people within 
the province.28 The court stated that the Premier 
was obliged to take reasonable steps to shield the 
residents of Khayelitsha from an unrelenting invasion 
of their fundamental rights because of continued 
police inefficiency in combating crime and the 
breakdown of relations between the police and the 
community.29  
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the role of 
the provincial executive in relation to policing was 
limited to monitoring, overseeing and liaison functions 
as set out in section 206 (3) of the Constitution. To 
give more teeth to the monitoring and oversight 
functions that the province enjoyed, section 206(5) 
was included in the Constitution to allow provinces 
to set up commissions of inquiry to investigate 
complaints of police inefficiency or a breakdown of 
relations between the police and a community, and to 
make recommendations to the Minister.30  
The Constitutional Court viewed the powers of a 
province to investigate or appoint a commission 
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of inquiry for complaints against police inefficiency 
and compromised police-community relations as 
a constitutionally mandated function. According to 
the Court, provinces were entitled to monitor and 
oversee the police function,31 as this was one of 
the mechanisms of accountability and oversight 
available to a province. Therefore, a commission 
of inquiry established for this purpose must be 
effective and capable of giving reasonable effect to 
the entitlement of a province over police function.32  
The Court furthermore rejected the position of the 
SAPS – namely that provinces can only perform such 
oversight via the structure of the Civilian Secretariat 
for Police33 established in terms of the Civilian 
Secretariat for Police Act.34  
However, what needed to be established was 
whether a commission established for this 
purpose with the powers to subpoena witnesses 
was tantamount to usurping the control of the 
police service. The Minister of Police and the 
National Commissioner of Police contended that 
a commission of inquiry with powers to subpoena 
was tantamount to controlling the police, which was 
the constitutionally reserved function of the National 
Commissioner. The Constitutional Court dismissed 
this argument. It stated that to appoint a commission 
of inquiry with powers to subpoena witnesses did not 
give the province competence to control and direct 
the police service and, further, that a commission 
without powers to subpoena would be unable to 
fulfil its mandate.35 It said that provincial functions of 
monitoring, overseeing and promoting community-
police relations would never be achieved if police 
were immune from being called upon to testify or 
produce documents on their policing functions.36 The 
Court further acknowledged the provisions dealing 
with inter-governmental cooperation and found that 
the Premier fully complied with her obligations in this 
regard.37 
The minority judgement of the Western Cape High 
Court, delivered by Justice Vincent Saldanha, 
elaborated on the exercise of these powers by 
the provincial executive within the context of the 
principles of co-operative governance in terms of 
chapter 3 of the Constitution. The minority judgement 
held that ‘the appointment of the commission of 
inquiry by the Premier under section 206 (5) with 
regard to policing must be exercised with proper 
regard to the provisions of the Constitution in respect 
of the powers and functions over police services and 
must occur within the context of Section 41 of the 
Constitution.’38  
Saldanha stated that the Premier and the MEC for 
Safety, on one side, were enjoined by the Constitution 
to engage with the Minister of Police and the National 
Commissioner of Police, on the other side, as a 
precursor to the establishment of the commission of 
inquiry. The minority judgement, applying the terms 
of the Constitution, held that the duty to engage was 
vested in both the national and provincial spheres of 
government.39 The latter judgement concluded that 
the decision to appoint the commission of inquiry 
was premature because, importantly, the Premier had 
failed to continue engaging with the Minister and the 
National Commissioner. She thereby failed to exhaust 
her obligations in terms of constitutional provisions 
on inter-governmental cooperation. The minority 
judgement in this matter emphasised the strict 
adherence to the principles of inter-governmental 
cooperation in resolving disputes between different 
spheres of government and/or organs of state. The 
minority judgement found that the Premier of the 
Western Cape had not exhausted her obligations 
under the Constitution in terms of inter-governmental 
cooperation.40  
Impediments to the exercise 
of provincial powers
The Constitutional Court made it clear that the 
powers of provinces with regard to policing were 
confined to monitoring, oversight and liaison. The 
Court also affirmed that these powers should be 
exercised with regard to the principles of co-operative 
governance as espoused in chapter 3 of the 
Constitution. However, it is the view of this writer that 
there are certain notable impediments to the exercise 
of these powers. These include, inter alia: 
•	 Non-recognition	of	provincial	executive	powers,	
as entrenched in section 206 of the Constitution, 
by provincial management of the SAPS.41 The 
provincial management of the SAPS in certain 
provinces objects to provincial executives 
exercising these powers.42  
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•	 The	limited	role	of	provinces	in	the	formulation	
and determination of a national policing policy. 
The authority to do this is vested in the Minister of 
Police, who must establish policy after consultation 
with the provincial government and taking into 
account the policing needs and priorities of the 
province.43 In essence, the provinces are at the 
mercy of the Minister in the determination of 
policing policy, especially those aspects that affect 
the provinces.44 
•	 Complaints	from	the	public	are	the	precursor	to	
the appointment of a commission of inquiry or 
investigation. The provincial executive cannot 
ex mero motu set up a commission of inquiry 
or investigation.45 To do so would be viewed as 
usurping the powers of control of the SAPS, which 
are vested in the National Commissioner.
•	 After	the	work	of	a	commission	of	inquiry	has	been	
completed, the recommendations are sent to the 
Minister.46 The Minister may decide not to take 
action or may frustrate the process if he/she was 
against the appointment of the commission in the 
first place.
•	Weak	provincial	legislature	will	compromise	police	
accountability at the provincial level; more so if the 
legislature does not exercise the powers vested 
in it by the Constitution. This includes calling the 
provincial commissioner to answer questions put 
to him/her and to consider the provincial SAPS’s 
annual report. One of the primary ways in which 
the legislature contributes to the oversight of the 
police is through holding the provincial executive 
and Department of Community Safety accountable 
for fulfilling its mandate.47  
•	 The	requirements	for	strict	adherence	to	the	
principles of cooperative governance can frustrate 
the province in exercising its policing powers, 
especially if national government does not 
cooperate with the province.48 
Conclusion
The adjudication of this matter by the High Court and 
the subsequent appeal to the Constitutional Court 
has brought some clarity on the powers of provinces 
with regard to policing. The Constitution makes 
it clear that policing is a national competency.49 
However, this does not mean that provinces have no 
role in policing, in particular in holding the provincial 
police management to account. 
The provincial executive also has a responsibility 
to promote good police-community relations. The 
exercise of these powers is not without challenges, 
but the challenges can be minimised if provincial 
executives understand the parameters of their 
powers. The ruling party, in its discussion paper, 
has advocated that the roles and responsibilities 
of provinces must be legislated so as to remove 
any uncertainty and possibility of disputes. 
Furthermore, the discussion document advocates 
the strengthening of the powers and functions of 
provinces.50 Equally, SAPS provincial management 
must accept and embrace the constitutional 
responsibility of the provincial executive to hold police 
in the province accountable for their actions. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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